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We  often  act  in  order  to  know.  One  celebrated  instance  of  this  is  scientific
experimentation, but as epistemic acts experiments in science have a lot in common
with a variety of everyday activities, such as asking for the time or wiping your glasses.
The important feature is that the act succeeds only if knowledge results. (The intention
is usually directed to getting at the truth on some topic, and if the intention is satisfied
because of the action, then the result is knowledge. What if a true belief results, but in
an unintended accidental way? That’s complicated – see Morton 2012a – but it is not the
topic here.) Capacities of doing this well are thus both epistemic and practical virtues. In
this paper I explore one central virtue of experimentation, which I eventually name the
virtue of  experiment-shopping. It  is the virtue of  knowing if  an experiment is worth
performing, and although some obvious examples of it are found in scientific practice, I
believe it is important throughout our intellectual lives. To call this capacity a virtue is to
link it to a particular kind of success, that of coming to know if an experiment is the one
to carry out. You can also say that if the virtue is used then the determination whether
to carry out the experiment is arrived at well, as long as you don’t build into this any
ideas of its following any particular rational method. All I mean is that it is sensitive to
the factors that make experiments achieve their ends or fail. In the last section of the
2paper I connect the virtue to intellectual virtues in general. But first I discuss the ubiquity of
experiment.
31. experiments everywhere 
Simple  everyday  experiments  involve  no  special  equipment,  and  ideas  about
experimental design are rarely consulted. Yet they fit the fundamental pattern that in
order to learn something one does something, making information emerge which would
not have otherwise. For example, you are on a committee interviewing candidates for a
job which involves dealing with a range of people on a range of topics. A letter for one
candidate says that he does not suffer fools gladly, that he is inclined to be brusque and
visibly impatient with people who he takes to be confused or wasting his time. The letter
may be exaggerating or malicious, and you would like some better evidence. So you ask
a stupid question. You put a lot of thought into your stupidity, and at the interview you
make an elaborate suggestion about his area of expertise that rests on a conflation of
two similar-sounding words.  The outcome is unpredictable. It may be that he seethes
with contempt, that he patiently and tactfully unravels the confusion, that he deflects the
question, or something in-between. Some of these outcomes will  tell  you more than
others. 
That experiments are causal interactions to epistemic ends was noted by Ian Hacking 
some time ago. See chapters 2 and 9 of Hacking 1983. The theme has been ignored in a
lot of more recent work but see Radder 1996, and Woodward 2003. I do not find in any 
of this otherwise admirable work recognition of the continuity between the scientific and 
the everyday, of the kind that the interview example illustrates.
4Several basic points are illustrated by informal experiments such as the interview case.
Most basic of all, the experiment is an act – the realisation of an intention by causing
some change in the world - which can be well-thought out or not, and can be successful
or not. It is an act whose purpose is epistemic, but the thinking behind it does not fall
into a traditional category of belief-directed reasoning. One reason for this is that what
belief  it  is  that  results  depends on something unpredicted  that  happens outside the
person's cognition.  The opposite is also common, where you form a belief in order to
achieve a practical aim, as when you look at the weather forecast in order to choose the
best day for the picnic, but we are now concerned with walking to the hill where you can
see the clouds in the west. Often, of course, we perform an action in order to gain
knowledge in order to be able to do something: walking to the hill in order to predict the
weather in order to time the picnic. In the interview example you do the experiment to
learn  if  the  candidate  is  tactful  in  order  to  appoint  the  best  person.  Epistemic  and
practical are usually entwined. Experimentation overlaps with thinking when a person
wonders what she thinks on a topic ("would we be happier if nothing was secret", "are
there really fundamental rights") by posing various hard questions to herself and seeing
how  she  reacts.  This  is  a  kind  of  self-experiment  similar  to  those  one  performs
conversationally with other people. With oneself or with others, it produces information,
material for thinking about, which one could not which one could not have got just by
thinking or passively perceiving.
5The  interview experiment  is  also  typical  in  that  it  has  a  cost.  In  asking  the  stupid
question you make the candidate think less of you, and this may have repercussions.
You use up time in the interview that could be used on other topics. You affect the
atmosphere later in the interview. If you are thinking whether and how to perform the
experiment you have to formulate these costs and risks, which have to be considered
together with the benefits of the information you might gain. 
Thirdly,  this  experiment  like  many  others  has  an  unpredicted  outcome.  The
unpredictedness is hard to state carefully. It is reminiscent of epistemic paradoxes such
as Kripke's observation that when one has good evidence for a belief one also has good
evidence that evidence against it is likely to be misleading, and therefore to be ignored.
(The idea comes from Saul Kripke, but its first appearance in print was p 148 of Harman
1973.) In the interview case you can expect several possible general types of response
from the candidate. You may well consider some of these more likely than others. But
you don't take yourself to know what the outcome of the experiment will be. Often one is
surprised when an experiment turns out as it does, but in planning the experiment one
does not take it for granted that it will not turn out this way. One does, though, make
more elaborate contingency plans for following up the more expected outcomes than the
less expected ones. In planning the interview you may think that it is pretty unlikely that
the candidate will simply ignore the mistake in the question, but you still You may well
consider some of  these more likely than others. But you don't take yourself to know
what the outcome of the experiment will be. Often one is surprised when an experiment
turns out as it does, but in planning the experiment one does not take it for granted that
6it will not turn out this way. One does, though, make more elaborate contingency plans
for following up the more expected outcomes than the less expected ones. In planning
the interview you may think that it is pretty unlikely that the candidate will simply ignore
the mistake in the question, but you still prepare a follow-up question to highlight it in
case he does. You think it pretty likely that he will use some abusive language to you,
and so on the one hand you prepare a pretence of injured pride in order to test his
reaction to information that he is causing distress, and on the other hand you think how
to get across to him later that no harm was done (except to his job prospects.) The
situation  also  resembles  the  strategic  interactions  studied  in  game  theory.  There
although one player may have expectations about what another is more or less likely to
do, a prediction of the other's actions cannot be separated from a decision of what to do
oneself (since the other is basing their action in part on a prediction of what the first
player will do.) An experiment is a game against (or with) nature in this respect: your
moves depend not on what you expect the other to do but on what values the possible
outcomes have for you. (Considering experiments as games against nature opens up
formal ideas, due to Abraham Wald. See Gigerenzer and others 1990. The similarity of
experiment to strategic interaction described here is more basic than, and independent
of, these ideas.)
 
These features are found in  formal  scientific  experiments,  too,  and in  innumerable
everyday  information-eliciting  procedures.  One  finds  out  if  someone  is  awake  by
whispering a message; one finds out if there is water in the well by dropping a pebble
7into it; one finds out if the enemy is still out there by sticking one's head above the
parapet.  It  is  important  in  distinguishing  these  from  non-experimental  inquiry  to
emphasise  that  the  procedure  has a  causal  effect  that  allows the  information that
would not otherwise be available to be produced. The nearest that simple perception
comes to this is in some uses of one's tactile sense, as when one feels how many coins
are in one's pocket by actively moving them around. (Fingers are special in that they
both move and feel, in ways that are often inseparable.) Just opening one's eyes is an
action, and can be intended to produce a situation in which information is available, as
is  flipping  a  light  switch,  but  these  should  be  seen  as  at  most  limiting  cases  of
experimentation.  I  shall  take  it  that  in  even  very  informal  experimentation  one
performs an action,  the action produces a situation that would not otherwise have
existed, and the existence or features of this situation provide data one wants in order
to form opinions. When a person opens her eyes she is producing a situation - her eyes
being open and light striking her retinas - in which information is available, but it is
information about the scene rather than about the state of her eyes or the effects of
opening them. When the bandages are removed from someone recovering from an eye
operation and she first opens her eyes, that is a real experiment. 
2. success 
An experiment has gone well  when the intended situation has been produced and it
provides information that is relevant to the question at issue. (In science, experiments
8are usually directed at fairly specific questions; less so in everyday life, though in both
there is a virtue of asking and probing at the right level of generality.) Then it has been
successful, in more than the minimal sense of producing knowledge. (It is a frustrating
success when you get the information you wanted, but in terms of the questions that
matter to you, you are none the not among those anticipated and one is not prepared for
the information that results. When you ask your stupid question a feature of the wording
may produce a reply that reveals a completely different flaw than the one you were
probing for.  The experiment has then failed in that you did not get an answer to a
particular question, and has succeeded in that you did get an answer to a more general
question that also interests you, such as "is he qualified?" Suppose that events take a
completely unexpected turn and all that you learn is that the candidate has halitosis.
Then, I would say, the experiment has failed as an experiment though it has provided
information which other intellectual virtues can use. (As when you turn the switch on the
accelerator and blow every circuit in Geneva, thus failing to learn anything about the
Higgs but a lot about the Swiss power grid.) If an experiment has gone well then it is an
accomplishment and results in knowledge. If it is conducted well then it exhibits virtues,
of  planning  and  anticipation  and  use  of  resources.  Of  course  a  well  conducted
experiment  will  often  not  go  well.  (Thinking  of  experiments  as  primarily  sources  of
information is of course very common in the philosophy of science. For a discussion of
evidence that makes a place for the results of experiment see Achinstein 2001.) 
9What is the relation between knowledge, accomplishment, and the virtues of 
experimentation? I am interested in intellectual virtues that are epistemic in the sense 
that they concern the conduct of inquiry but also practical in that they aim at an 
accomplishment, the production of specific information. One very basic such virtue is the
capacity to devise the situation that will produce the information. 
Virtues are double-edged. In the external direction they are directed at the information-
giving situations and the production of opinions from them. And in the internal direction
they are directed at making use of the information, and thus at the cognitive economy of
the agent, the use of her pattern of beliefs and desires and the shape of her reasoning.
It is be a bad experiment if it produces loads of information which cannot be made sense
of. And it is unreasonable to undertake an experiment if there is good reason to expect
that instead of having the desired effect it will frustrate the experimenter’s deeper aims.
It is unreasonable for that agent at that moment even if it turns out to result in the
perfect informative clue to the question.
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Since experimentation is aimed at a result it is subject to a basic constraint of practical
reason, the need to find a means to an end that accommodates other competing ends.
You don't drive a Mercedes because although you would then be safe and elegant you
would be hungry and indebted and harming the environment. Since experiments have
costs,  the  experiment  has  to  be  designed  so  that  it  provides  information  without
disrupting other projects.  These other projects can themselves be epistemic, but there
is not a lot to be gained by distinguishing between competition from epistemic and other
aims, since there is no end of things it would be good to understand, most of which
would gain from non-trivial experiments, and a very finite time for any single person to
devote to them. Doing all but the simplest experiments means renouncing others. And
accomplishing  all  but  the  simplest  experimental  or  practical  aim  means  renouncing
others, of both kinds. So we might as well throw all a person's aims together into the
same pan, all to be balanced against all.
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One of the features of an experiment that is crucial to this balancing is the amount of
light it might shed on questions the person has reason to be interested in. (Curiosity is a
good reason, often.) The issue is impossibly complicated. An experiment - even a pretty
trivial one as in the interview example - has many possible outcomes, and the facts any
of these reveal can be inputs to many different lines of thought. There are several kinds
of linked imponderables. What will  the physical  outcome of the experiment be? How
much relevant information will it provide? How successful will one be in exploiting the
information, to refute a conjecture, formulate a new one, or adjudicate between existing
hypotheses? Against these imponderables there is one manageable fact, the likely cost
of  the  experiment.   (It's  certainly  not  a  given,  since  the  consequences  of  the
experiment-as-act ramify into the future, but it is usually more nearly something one can
get a comparative grasp on than the other questions.) The ability to handle situations of
this shape, with these uncertainties deriving from these projects, is my main interest in
this paper. 
One important kind of experiment is a continuation or repeat of an experiment that has
already been performed. After the candidate responds with only mild irritation to your
question you ask him an even stupider one, in order to find his  explosion point.  In
science  it  is  important  that  experiments  can be  replicated,  and  in  everyday  life  we
sometimes fail to repeat them in part because of the familiar fact that we underestimate
the  importance  of  a  person's  situation  on  her  actions.  (We  mode  of  operation.)  A
repeated or continued experiment produces more evidence to add to the evidence we
already have, so in deciding whether to do it we have to decide whether the cost is
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justified given that we could instead do other experiments or throw a party to celebrate
the results we already have. One particularly important case arises when the initial data
in an experiment suggests that the experiment itself is doing harm. This can happen
when a drug being tested is worsening the condition of subjects. Then the experiment is
giving information about its own cost, and this is relevant to the question of continuing
it. A pre-scientific analog is sticking your head above the parapet. If you immediately
attract  enemy fire  you are reluctant  to  repeat the experiment in  order  to  get more
information about the number of enemy shooters. 
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So questions of cost are ubiquitous in experimentation. Not all experimenters have to
face the most intractable forms of them. The budget for many scientific experiments is
set in advance, or at any rate severely limited, by allocations in a department budget, a
research grant, or other similar factors. So taking cost in this very narrow sense, there is
often an upper bound to how much a proposed experiment can cost. Still, within a fixed
budget,  variant experiments are possible,  and the experimenter has to decide which
ones to run. That means comparing different possible experiments, and to do this one
has to face the unpredictability of their results and the problems of anticipating what one
will be able to make of these results. 
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3. intractability 
I am now in a position to describe the virtue that is the target of this paper. It is the
capacity to evaluate possible experiments, in order to decide whether to do them. I do
not mean simply the capacity to plan an experiment sensibly, maximizing the chances of
getting desired results. I mean the externalist capacity actually to proceed when the
objective situation will result in both the need for knowledge and the need for solvency
(etc)  being  satisfied.   There  is  obviously  no  such  infallible  capacity,  and  there  are
obviously many component skills  of sensitivity  to the environment and to one’s  own
proclivities, different ones being relevant to different situations for different people. But
this is a large part of what makes it a virtue and not a simple skill: its essence consists
in getting a certain kind of result in a certain kind of situation. 
One  central  consideration  in  the  choice  between  experiments  is  that  different
experiments give different amounts of evidence. This can be a result of such familiar
factors  as  sample  sizes  and  the  effort  made  to  randomise  within  blocks.  Generally
speaking, the experiments that give more evidence cost more. Experiments that promise
more significant evidence also tend to be more expensive. In one kind of experiment
more varied samples are required, the randomization is more thorough, or the block
structure allows protocols that might eliminate more alternative hypotheses. In another
kind, more sensitive equipment is used, or it is applied to a richer variety of cases. The
consequence is that one often has to decide how much and what quality evidence to try
for. As a result, we do not, nor should we, always go for the most and the best. So how
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are these decisions made? 
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I do not think they can be made on the basis of a simple cost-benefit comparison. These
are feasible - the project of making them makes sense - when there is a manageable
variety  of  comparable  values  of  specific  outcomes  and  an  intelligible  probability
distribution over them for every action under consideration. Under values of outcomes I
am including gains of understanding and expenses of performance, and the actions in
questions are ways of carrying out the experiment. In the simple ideal case there would
be a series of ways of carrying out the experiment, graded in order of expense - you pay
$1k and you get the basic experiment, you pay $2k and you get a more careful one, you
pay  $100k  and  you  get  a  super  one  with  many  control  groups  and  loads  of
randomization - and the likelihood of getting a given amount of information for a given
expense could be assessed. But nothing like this is almost ever the case. There are
problems of comparability and problems of prediction. 
The major problems of comparability are between the costs of experimentation and the
information  gained.  Suppose  for  the  sake  of  argument  that  the  costs  can  all  be
expressed in terms of money (though in many cases this does not seem plausible.) The
benefit of an experiment is the light it throws on some uncertain question. The outcomes
cannot normally be expressed in terms of units of information, as if outcome gives twice
as much information as another. (Remember that in order to compare expected values
we need cardinal comparisons of the values of outcomes, and not just an ordering of
them.)  Issues  about  comparability  and  the  problemst  hey  make  for  cost-benefit  or
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(equivalently) expected utility thinking are discussed in Morton 1990 and the essays in
Chang  1996.  Issues  of  incomparability  have  gone  quiet  lately,  but  they  beg  to  be
connected with questions about the value of knowledge raised in Kvanvig 2003. 
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Instead,  the  manageable  way  to  think  of  the  outcomes  is  as  settling  very  simple
questions, causing one to know their answers. Did the applicant lose his temper; did the
subjects respond more quickly to the items they had been primed for? Then the benefits
in question are the information these answers give to the questions of primary interest.
Is the applicant likely to be a difficult colleague; is there an unconscious representation
of  some  category  of  information,  playing  some  given  functional  role?  If  we  could
measure the degrees of support that these possible simple answers give to the primary
questions then we would have something to match against  money.  But  the issue is
notoriously hard and even with formalised simple hypotheses there is no consensus how
to do it. The existing formal accounts of comparative strength of evidence will not apply,
for example, when the hypotheses contain higher-order terms such as "there is some
unknown factor which correlates phenomenon A with phenomenon B". And as noted
above ordinal comparisons will not do: we would need numerical measures of evidential
strength. All this is before we even try to introduce the different interests of the different
hypotheses  that  might  get  the  different  degrees  of  support.  Or  factors  other  than
support, such as understanding why a hypothesis might be true or how 
a causal mechanism might operate. 
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Some problems of comparability are mollified by the fact that an experiment often has a
budget, with an upper limit, and we are often reluctant to leave any of it unspent. (We
don't like returning any of the research grant, and we are not allowed to donate it to
famine relief.) So some experiments are ruled out and a central question is simply "how
can we best spend $N?" Even then, less expensive ways of carrying out the experiment
proper will  have other benefits, some of them epistemic. We could do our consumer
choice experiment with a large group of subjects, with payoffs in real money so that
their motives are realistic, or we can save money by having a smaller sample and paying
them with tokens for a lottery, and spend the rest of the grant on database software
which will allow us to categorize the results of this and other studies. Comparability then
re-enters the picture. 
The problems of prediction are if anything greater than the problems of comparability. As
noted above, the outcome of each proposed experimental avenue is open as a matter of
principle: if we had much confidence how it would turn out we would have less reason to
do  the  experiment.  So  it  is  hard  to  have  more  than  the  roughest  assignment  of
probabilities  of  what  I  called  the  simple  answers  just  above  conditional  on  variant
experimental  procedures.  And  given  these  simple  answers  there  is  the  problem  of
predicting the support they will give to ideas about the questions of interest. No doubt a
competent experimentalist will have thought out the consequences of various anticipated
outcomes, so that she can say that if one of them occurs then evidence of a given force
for or against a then in thinking out its consequences, for example in preparing her
results  for publication, she will  see more alternative possibilities more complications.
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There is a kind of circular trap here: the more time she spends working out the likelihood
that a hypothesis will have been confirmed to a given degree the less time she will have
to do the same for other simple outcomes and other hypotheses, and the more indefinite
her expectation of getting any particular degree of support for any hypothesis will be. 
Consider  a  simple  prediction-testing  experimental  situation.  We  know  that  general
relativity predicts that the paths of particles will follow geodesics shaped by the presence
of mass, and gives predictions about the exact paths involved. We are lucky enough to
have a neutrino-measuring instrument on the moon and can measure the influence of
the presence of the sun on neutrinos from a neutrino star. (This is evidently a science
fictional experiment, so objections of unfeasibility or physical implausibility are to be put
aside.) We can be pretty confident in advance that if the deviation of the paths of the
neutrinos, for example in producing a double image, is exactly what general relativity
predicts then we will have added confirmation for it, though it may be hard to assess
how  much.  And  we  can  be  somewhat  confident  that  if  the  deviation  is  extremely
different then we will have significant disconfirmation for general relativity. Of course we
would be surprised by either of these. The most likely outcome is something near to the
prediction of accepted theory, with the difference ascribable to experimental error. But
what will we conclude if the observed result is between these extremes? We will have to
consider the possibility that we are wrong about the mass and shape of the sun, or the
speed and mass of the kinds of neutrino, or the physics behind the neutrino detector. We
may have made some relevant simplification in modeling the interaction of enormous
and tiny objects. What will we say if two thirds of the particles are within the expected
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range but one third of them are weirdly deviant? Will that lead us, and others, to suspect
that the theory is correct and some unknown factor is causing a random deviation, or
that something physically mysterious is going on? It will obviously take a while for the
physics community to digest such a result and predicting their verdict is not something
you  want  to  charge  experimentalists  with.  (The  capacities  required  to  handle  such
situations  are  related  to  those  discussed  in  Fairweather  2012.)  The  situation  the
experimentalist would prefer to be in is to be given a theory and a consequence of it that
will appear in a novel situation, and a budget. Then the experimentalist doesn't question
the budget but tries to produce the novel situation within its limits. 
4 experiment-shopping 
So, whether planning job interviews or testing relativity, we do not decide which 
experiments to run by doing a cost-benefit analysis. How we do it? 
We do it by being good experiment-planners, knowing which and how much data we
want to collect. There is an intellectual virtue here, a mixed epistemic-practical virtue.
(For epistemic virtues see Zagzebski 1996 and Sosa 2001. My own approach is different,
as suggested below.) It mixes the epistemic and the practical in that one’s aims affect
how  much one  knows,  rather  than  the  possibility  debated  in  the  ‘pragmatic
encroachment’ literature (Fantl and McGrath 2010) of whether one’s aims affect whether
one knows. It is distinct from the experimentalist's virtue of ingenuity: being able to
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devise the setups that will force nature into the situations where unexpected things may
happen. I have nothing to say about the psychology of the virtue in question, except
that one place it is found is in the largely middle-aged experiment-managers who advise
the ingenious ones on what they might try, approve and administer research grants, and
generally shoulder the burden of deciding whether a data-producing project is worth the
trouble. In saying that it is a virtue and that there are places to look for it I do not mean
to  claim  that  it  is  usually  exhibited  ideally,  or  even  well.  
The right way to approach intellectual  virtues,  I  believe and have argued elsewhere
(chapter  two  of  Morton  2012b),  is  in  terms  of  their  conditions  for  success.  What
situations are they applied to, and what outcomes do they aim at? The virtue we are
discussing applies when there are several actions one can perform whose main benefit
will  be to  provide  evidence  relevant  to  some questions  of  interest,  and which  have
different  costs  one  would  like  to  minimize.  The  outcome it  aims  at  has  two  sides,
knowing the answer to the question and being satisfied with having paid what one did for
it. Finally we know it well enough to name it: call this the virtue of experiment-shopping.
It is a skill  of  buying a good enough experiment at a low enough price, of  actually
accomplishing these, not just worthily striving towards them or blindly fumbling in their
direction. I have argued that we do not exercise this virtue by calculating and comparing
costs and benefits. In fact we do not evaluate the desirability of outcomes and the likely
results of courses of action independently at all. We consider whole situations, in which
we  or  others  face  uncertainty  about  what  to  do  in  order  to  uncover  uncertain
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information, and we assimilate new situations to them. At least that if what we do if the
capacity here is a typical intellectual virtue of a bounded agent, and if I am right about
how such virtues operate. 
I have gestured at such an analysis in Morton (2004) and develop it at length in Morton
(2012b).   The  essential  elements  are  a  database  of  past  situations  with  the
satisfactoriness  of  their  solutions,  and  a  similarity  measure  that  can  relate  novel
situations to stored ones. These will vary from one agent to another depending on their
experience  and  how well  they  have  assimilated  it.  Then  given  a  new situation  -  a
question  needing  information,  a  range  of  actions  that  might  prompt  it,  background
information - an agent can find solutions that are in a very general way like ones that
have worked in the past - pushing out the boat for a grand and risky exploration, or a
careful and tentative probe that might reveal whether the topic is fertile or recalcitrant.
This may involve ingenuity and creative thinking, to see surprising similarities, or it may
rely on rote learning of experimental paradigms in one's area of science. In either case it
is  likely  to  be  very  subject-specific:  someone  who  makes  the  right  probes  when
interviewing  candidates  may  be  disastrous  in  allocating  money  for  DNA  sequencing
equipment.
Virtues understood in this way will be in a general way externalist, in that a capacity that
is a virtue in one situation may not be a virtue in another, and the agent may not be able
to tell one from the other. They could also be called reliabilist virtues, in that they are
24
parts of reliable ways of getting true belief, and in fact reliable in ways that lead to
knowledge, and more generally to accomplishment. For the purposes of this paper, these
taxonomic issues are not important. What is important is the existence of the profitable
species of  thinking I  have been describing,  the necessity of  using it  throughout our
activities, and the facts that it can be carried out more or less well. 
The similarity of this virtue to others and my praise of my general analysis do not 
clinch the case. But look at the features of experimental choice that we can explain in 
this way. They can be gathered under three heads 
-We make reasonable choices in situations whose complexity and incomparability 
prevent our thinking them out from first principles. 
- We can train one another to make acceptable choices, even though in learning 
one acquires little information that one did not already have. 
-  We articulate many of the considerations we find relevant in threshold terms. Is 
the prospect of finding relevant enough to justify the expense? Does the design 
rule out enough alternatives? Have we collected enough evidence that we can now
devote our resources to other tasks? 
These have immediate explanations on the picture I am suggesting. But they become
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miraculous if we do not see them in terms of a specific acquired virtue. Acquiring the
virtue is a central and indispensable part of any scientist's training. And acquiring the
corresponding virtues in social interaction and in learning from others is essential to
success in those areas. In social life one learns to probe, show emotions and provoke
reactions,  in  ways  that  will  lead  others  to  reveal  their  emotions,  intentions,  and
opinions. You frown when you want the other to explain more fully. In one’s education
one learns who to turn to for explanations, and how to do it effectively. You search
out  someone  who  understands  why  some  customers  hate  some  websites.  Some
people do some forms of each of these better than others, and everyone gets at least
a little better at it with practice. 
5 theory to the rescue? 
There is an objection that will occur to anyone with experience of planning and carrying
out experiments in contemporary science. We have a complex and developed theory of
experimental design. It mixes common sense and sophisticated unintuitive statistics, and
is treated with respect from field botany to theoretical physics. But if we can choose our
experiments on the basis of a theory, virtues are not needed. Knowledge, intelligence,
and careful rule-following will be enough. 
The  theory  of  experimental  design,  from  Fisher  to  the  present  (Fisher  1935,
Cochrane  and  Cox  1950)  provides  quantitative  measures  of  the  tests  that
experiments provide of hypotheses and estimates. (Careful phrasing is needed here,
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as the relation of  these measures to familiar  notions of  evidence,  probability,  or
support is controversial.) Armed with these measures, we can say in advance
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how stringent a test a given experimental design will give a hypothesis, and how one
design compares to alternative designs. So we can give advice about how suitable a
proposed experiment is for given purposes: about which factors should be randomized,
how many trials should be run and how large samples should be, and so on. The theory
explains  how  factorial  and  sequential  designs  can  be  efficient  in  unexpected  ways,
though comparison of their results with those of more traditional designs is subtle and
unobvious. All this advice is based not on the operation of any carefully acquired virtue,
but the direct application of an explicit theory. 
Some of the information provided by the theory of experimental design is not at all
obvious. I am thinking in particular of conclusions about number of trials and size of
sample needed to get confidence limits within given bounds, which do not fall into an
easily  intuited  pattern  (Cochrane  and  Cox  pp.  23-29).  If  without  aid  of  theory  an
experimentalist  had  an  intuitive  grasp  of  what  was  needed here,  she  would  indeed
possess a rare and delicate virtue. And indeed the complexity and subtlety of the theory
is an argument that in non-scientific contexts the art is based on a delicate projection
from similar cases rather than on an application of explicit principles. I do not think it is
impossible that someone designing scientific experiments might have an intuitive grasp
of  the  force  of  sample  sizes  and  numbers  of  trials,  but  it  must  be  rare.  So let  us
disregard the possibility and assume that when we want such things in precise form they
can only be known by derivation from an unobvious theory. 
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Virtues are still required. The most obvious one addresses the question "given that we
can do experiments E or F providing tests of stringency s and t of theories A and B, with
which should we proceed?" Suppose you can try an experiment which, if it succeeds, will
provide a weak test of an ambitious version of your theory, or a different experiment
which if it succeeds will provide a stronger test of a special case of the theory. Neither
may succeed, and no theory of experimental design will provide you with probabilities for
the underlying facts.  The prudent course might be to test the special case first, but
success  there  might  not  be  dramatic  enough  to  get  you  funding  to  do  the  more
ambitious test. So how much more valuable, scientifically, is the more ambitious claim?
And how reliable is your hunch that your experiment will confirm it? For that matter how
much more believable will the claim be if a test of this kind is passed? None of these
questions are answered by any theory of experimental design, and all of them require a
very delicate mixture of sensitivities. 
Good use of the theory can be of immense help to experimentalists. It is not an easy
theory, and most practicing experimentalists have more sense than to trust their grasp
of it. Instead, they consult statisticians, or colleagues in their disciplines who specialise
in the topic. So part of the experiment-shopping virtue is substituted for by a different
complex of virtues, which also have an informal experimental component, the virtues of
knowing when one's own ignorance suggests taking advice, who to consult, and how to
adapt what they say to your actual situation. Statisticians and experimentalists tend to
speak  rather  different  anguages  and  have  rather  different  concerns,  so  that  the
adaptation  is  often  not  trivial.  No  wonder  that  many departments  of  psychology  or
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zoology include a colleague whose special role is to bridge the gap between theory and
practical sense. 
6  continuity 
I have been arguing that there are special skills of acting to know, of interacting with the
environment in such a way that one acquires the knowledge one needs, and that these
serve a distinctive purpose which justifies us in gathering them together as virtues of
experimentation.  In  particular,  skills  of  assessing  whether  an  experiment  is  worth
performing are worthy of attention, and separating out as a distinctive virtue. The skills
involved in achieving these ends in social life, everyday practical activity, and scientific
disciplines  are  varied  though  overlapping.  But  the  virtues  they  constitute  when
performed successfully  can  be  drawn together  as  an  identifiable  contribution  to  our
capacity to know and accomplish. They are part of a neglected but vital area of human
capacity, the ability to do the right thing in order to know an interesting thing. 
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